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ABSTRACT 
 
This article proposes a synthesis of cultural and cognitive perspectives on religious 
fundamentalism.  Cultural perspectives provide insights into the contents of 
fundamentalisms in socio-historical contexts.  Cognitive perspectives provide insights 
into the cognitive operations that contribute to a fundamentalist mentality.  A synthesis 
of the two perspectives reveals significant interactions between cultural contents and 
cognitive operations.  I apply a neo-Piagetian interactionist theory of cognitive 
development to engage the cultural content of religious fundamentalisms.  I provide 
illustrative examples of cultural contents from Christian and Muslim fundamentalisms 
that reflect and perpetuate a particular type of cognitive structure.  The synthesis 
contributes to the understanding and engagement of religious fundamentalism. 
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FUNDAMENTALISM: A SYNTHESIS OF CULTURAL AND COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Fundamentalism is an ambiguous and elusive concept.  Scholarly attempts to define fundamentalism have 
struggled to deal with its popular cross-cultural abstractions, and to escape its pejorative appropriations.  The 
term’s detractors perceive it to be nothing more than a ‘dirty fourteen-letter word’ used by modernists to 
marginalise their post-enlightenment criticsi.  The term’s defenders accept it reluctantly in lieu of a better 
alternativeii.  Beyond its somewhat ambiguous and pejorative usage, there seems to be something fundamental 
about fundamentalism.  I propose a synthesis of cultural and cognitive perspectives for a more integrative 
multidisciplinary understanding of fundamentalism. 
 
Cultural perspectives of religion tend to emphasise interpersonal dimensions of experience within a shared 
religious discourse.  They focus on the contents of a culture or social grouping (rituals, beliefs, practices, 
institutions, historical events etc.) and abstract organisational structures and dynamics.  Traditional socio-
cultural perspectives, like Emile Durkheim’s functionalism tend to subordinate the individual to the power of 
static social facts.  Here, the individual is a tabular rasa, a blank slate written over by socio-cultural content.  
More modern perspectives, like Anthony Gidden’s structuration theory record a much more dynamic interplay 
between individual agency and fluid social patternsiii.  However, the evolution of theory and practice can be a 
slow process and cultural approaches to religion still often neglect the influence of individual cognition on the 
reception and formation of culture.  Traditionally, cultural perspectives move from the social to the individual; 
from the external world to the internal world.  Accordingly, modern perspectives are often criticised for 
transmitting a legacy of neglect of the individual and the internal.  Professor of Religion Jason Slone notes, ‘We 
now know that cultural theories of religion are impoverished by a lack of understanding of how the mind works 
and thus why humans think what they think and do what they do’ iv. Fundamentalism provides a point of 
exchange where cultural perspectives may be enriched with cognitive understandings of how the mind works. 
 
Alternatively, cognitive perspectives of religion tend to emphasise individual and intrapersonal dimensions of 
experience.  They focus on the contents held, and behaviours exhibited by an individual, and then abstract 
mental structures and processes.  Early pseudo-cognitive perspectives like phrenology subordinated the 
individual to static mechanisms of mind.  More recent perspectives like neo-Piagetian interactionism emphasise 
the dynamic interplay between cultural milieus and cognitive structures.  However, it takes time for practice to 
embrace theoretical change.  Traditionally, cognitive perspectives move from the individual to the social, and 
from the internal world to the external world.  Accordingly, modern perspectives are still criticised for a legacy 
of neglecting the social and the external.  Professor of Religion and phenomenologist, Heinz Streib notes, ‘It is 
justified to speak of reductions with regard to religious development whenever the cognitive developmental 
logic is deemed to be not only the central theme, but also the motor of religious development, thus excluding 
dimensions of content, experiences, and function of religion’ v.  The solution to the cognitive ‘exclusion’ 
identified by Streib and the cultural ‘impoverishment’ identified by Slone, is surely to coordinate the two 
perspectives’ respective strengths.  Then, through synthesis and dialectic, scholarship may reach a better 
understanding of phenomena such as fundamentalism.  
 
This synthesis between culture and cognition is grounded in the assumption that they are interactive, rather than 
mutually exclusive influences.  It is also grounded in the assumption that a synthesis of perspectives is not only 
possible, but absolutely necessary.  The interactionist study of culture and cognition represents an emerging 
field, especially in its application to religion.  As noted in a recent introductory text, ‘The field of culture and 
cognition is far from being widely recognised and still lacks meaningful integration of the different approaches’ 
vi
.  Fundamentalism provides a valuable study for meaningful integration.  It is a way of thinking that emerges 
from a culture; reciprocally, it is a culture that emerges from a way of thinking.  
 
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON FUNDAMENTALISM 
 
It is perhaps understandable given the origins of the term fundamentalism that debate over definition has been 
dominated by cultural analyses.  Early cultural analyses described the beliefs, rituals, practices, institutions, 
group dynamics and historical roots of American Protestant Fundamentalism in the early part of the Twentieth 
Century vii.  To limit the definition of a term to this cultural context is to define a fundamentalist as one who 
adheres to these five beliefs: the inerrancy of the Bible; six-day ex-nihilo creationism; the reality of miracles; the 
virgin birth, Christ’s substitutionary death for the atonement of sins, and physical resurrection; and his imminent 
return.  The term fundamentalist was applied in a Muslim context as early as 1937viii, a usage that has increased 
significantly in post-September 11th popular discourse.  Similarly, fundamentalism has also been used to 
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describe Jewish ix, Hindu x, Sinhalese Buddhist xi and other religious movements.  Marty and Appleby’s multi-
volume Fundamentalist Project represents a collaborative attempt to identify structural similarities between 
diverse religious movements designated as fundamentalist xii.  Most recently, the term fundamentalism has been 
abstracted to describe non-religious cultures xiii which bear little cultural relation to the anti-modernist struggle 
of 1920s American Protestant Fundamentalism.  The increasing generalisation of fundamentalism across 
cultures has led to an interest in its psychological, and more specifically, its cognitive characteristics. 
 
Earlier cultural perspectives acknowledged the possibility of a psychology of fundamentalism.  James Barr, 
author of the seminal work - Fundamentalism, noted in a preface to the second edition: ‘…perhaps on deeper 
investigation it would turn out that the doctrinal and the psychological accounts of fundamentalism are not as 
fully in contrast as I have supposed’ xiv. A decade later, Marty and Appleby provided the following caveat to 
their Fundamentalism Project: ‘…while there may be such a thing as a ‘fundamentalist mentality’ which finds 
its expression in various ideological or scientific forms, here the prime interest has to do with fundamentalisms 
in which the religious dimension is foremost’ xv.  I suggest that understandings of fundamentalism will be 
impoverished until the interactive relationship between this ‘mentality’ and the ‘religious dimension’ is better 
recognised and investigated.   
 
COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVES ON FUNDAMENTALISM 
 
Cognitive perspectives focus on the structure and organisation of thought in the individual mind.  They assume 
the universality of neural mechanisms that give rise to cognitive processes.  They also tend to assume the 
primacy of the epistemic self as the centre and motor of human development xvi.  Cognitive perspectives often 
begin with the assumption that ‘religion is a natural by-product of cognition’ and ‘is not a cause of behaviour 
per se’ xvii.  The study of fundamentalism challenges the accuracy of this notion.  As we shall see in the 
following section, fundamentalism exemplifies the co-evolution of culture and cognition.  
 
Extended cognitive perspectives on religious fundamentalism are quite rare and recent.  They have generally 
emerged as applications of James Fowler’s work on faith development xviii which proposes six cognitively-based 
stages of faith xix.  Robert Shinn’s brief theoretical article, Fundamentalism as a Case of Arrested Development 
xx
, is perhaps the earliest application of Fowler’s structural-developmental theory to religious fundamentalism.  
Shinn suggests that fundamentalism is a manifestation of Fowler’s Stage 3 (synthetic-conventional) faith xxi.  
Fowler himself later characterises fundamentalism as a manifestation of Stage 2 (mythic-literal) faith, though 
without reference to specific fundamentalist contents.  What is the cognitive perspective guiding developmental 
theories of fundamentalism and can it be synthesised with cultural perspectives on fundamentalism?  
 
Structural-developmental theories of fundamentalism are essentially ‘neo Piagetian’ theories: applications of 
Jean Piaget’s genetic epistemology xxii.  Genetic epistemology refers to the cognitive construction of ways of 
knowing.  Piaget argued that the mind could no longer be seen as a static receptacle for knowledge.  He wanted 
to challenge the notion that knowing is static and immutable: ‘thought, then, is not momentary; it is not a static 
instance; it is a process’ xxiii.  According to Piaget, the mind constructs knowledge in stages of development that 
facilitate adaptation.  Adaptation is the attempt to fit, survive or prosper in a given environment. Cognitively, 
there are two processes that facilitate adaptation: assimilation and accommodation.  The process of assimilation 
involves the integration of new information into existing knowledge structures.  A structure could be seen as an 
organising pattern for knowledge.  To use an analogy, a structure is like a web that is sensitive to the vibrations 
of new knowledge.  It is an interconnected system organised by characteristic cognitive operations and abilities.  
However, some new information cannot be easily assimilated into existing knowledge structures.  Such 
information may create cognitive dissonance xxiv.  The resolution of cognitive dissonance involves either the 
distortion or repression of the new information or a more profound change in structure known as 
accommodation xxv.  This change is essentially a reorganisation of the structure.  Accommodation of a whole 
structure is akin to a paradigm shift.     
 
Accommodation and assimilation are interactive.  Piaget argued that intelligence reflected a healthy interplay or 
interaction between the two processes.  This interplay is marked by periods of structural stability or equilibrium 
where a general set of operations governs the interplay between assimilation and accommodation.  According to 
Piaget, the individual constantly strives for a state of equilibrium.  These periods of equilibrium are known as 
stages. A stage is a period when knowledge is consistently organised by the same cognitive operationsxxvi.  
Piaget argued that there is an invariant, incremental and universal sequence of identifiable stages through which 
cognition develops, and that a stage is generally consistent across multiple domains of knowledge (i.e. moral, 
logico-mathematical).  In theory, change in these stages is the product of many factors including physical brain 
development, and socio-cultural experience.  However, in application, Piagetians have often been criticised for 
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neglecting the latter factor.  Hence, the goal of this article: to provide a context for the re-establishment of a link 
between cognitive and cultural factors.  So, how have these cognitive processes been applied to 
fundamentalism? Is fundamentalism just a stage of cognitive development that is perpetuated by contents that 
arrest the radical accommodation that leads to a new stage?        
 
According to Fowler and Shinn, fundamentalism can in part be represented as a particular way of structuring 
information.  Therefore, from a cognitive developmental perspective, fundamentalism represents a stage.  For 
Fowler, the stage most closely representing fundamentalist cognition is Stage 2 (mythic-literal).  In mythic-
literal cognition: ‘Beliefs are appropriated with literal interpretations, as are moral rules and attitudes. Symbols 
are taken as one-dimensional and literal in meaning.  In this stage the rise of concrete operations leads to the 
curbing and ordering of the previous stage's imaginative composing of the world’ xxvii.  Recently, Heinz Streib 
has added to this conceptualisation of fundamentalism and introduced some important qualifications to cognitive 
developmental theory that support the synthesis proposed in this paper.  For Streib, fundamentalism is a 
heterodyning of mythic-literal and rationalistic stages  xxviii.  Heterodyning is a combining of stages, where the 
old stage is never fully left and the future stage is never fully entered.  Streib argues that adult heterodyning 
makes fundamentalism more ‘stable, more rigoristic, and more cruel’ xxix than its childhood styles.  In this 
heterodyning, fundamentalism transposes the mythic into the literal using developing cognitive powers to 
rationalise rather than transform past affective commitments.  The rigorous, rational style transforms the mythic 
commitments into literal propositions.  Author Malise Ruthven makes related observations in his analyses of 
Islamic fundamentalismxxx.  In A Fury for God, Ruthven argues that Islamist leaders are characteristically those 
who revive childhood mythology with a monodimensional rationalism: ‘A consistent pattern emerges, across all 
these different countries, of fundamentalists drawing heavily from students and university graduates in the 
physical sciences, usually students with rural or traditionally religious backgrounds’ xxxi.  The rural mythic 
interpretations of Islam formed in childhood are defended with a rigourous scientific literalism formed in young 
adulthood xxxii.  While such observations seem to support the developmental model, Streib’s study of 
fundamentalism raises important qualifications to traditional cognitive-structural perspectives.   
 
Fundamentalism obviously exerts a very powerful cultural influence on the individual’s cognitive processes.  
The study of fundamentalist culture and individual cognition causes a reassessment of the primacy of cognition 
driving the direction of development.  It forces a reengagement with affective, social, and cultural influences.  
With these influences acknowledged, development becomes an altogether more messy and less linear process 
xxxiii
. Furthermore, the formative power of fundamentalism and its cultural effect on cognitive style pose a 
challenge to Slone’s claims that ‘religion is not a cause of behaviour’ and that religion, ‘does not determine how 
we think or act’ xxxiv.  These are not useful statements when the existence and complexity of interaction between 
fundamentalist contents and individual cognition is considered.  The serious task ahead for theories of religion is 
to provide more powerful explanatory theories and empirical studies of the relationship between cognitive 
structures and the contents of religious cultures.       
 
There is already tacit evidence of the interaction between religious cultures and individual cognition in social-
psychological studies.  Such studies reveal a relationship between fundamentalism and low cognitive 
complexity on religious issues xxxv; fundamentalism and measures of ‘cognitive bondage’ where individuals are 
not free or able to question their beliefs xxxvi; and fundamentalism and limited creative thinking xxxvii.  Rokeach 
found that Southern Baptists scored mostly highly for dogmatism where dogmatism referred to rigidity in 
thinking, intolerance of ambiguity, and inability to deal with new information xxxviii.  Results of a Gallup Poll 
published in 1989 revealed that in terms of literal Biblical belief, ‘Education is the major variable, with belief in 
the literal truth of the Bible decreasing according to the educational background’ xxxix.  Oser and Gmünder found 
that a person’s level of formal education does exert an influence on the stage development of their religious 
judgement xl.  These studies imply a two-way relationship between cultural factors and cognitive competencies.
  
 
There are few studies focussing explicitly on the interaction between cognitive structures and the contents of 
fundamentalist cultures. Oser and Gmünder identified the relationship between cognitive structure and cultural 
content in their 1991 study of religious judgement: 
 
Cultural development can hamper or sponsor the construction of individual stages while, simultaneously, shaping 
the content of the stages.  A certain content may be inappropriate at a certain time and may therefore fail to yield 
religious reasoning...the social praxis of meaning-making either sponsors or hampers the religious structures...This 
means that structures take shape differently in different cultures or civilisations. xli 
 
Perhaps the most extended study of culture and cognition is Barnes’ seminal, Stages of Thought: The 
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Coevolution of Religious Thought and Science xlii.  Barnes uses a Piagetian framework to trace the cultural-
cognitive development of science and religion.  His premise is that, ‘A culture may maintain a simpler easier 
style of thought as its dominant style for many centuries or even millennia, even if some individuals go beyond 
the culture’s general achievement’ xliii.  Fowler refers to this relationship between cognition and culture as ‘the 
structuring power of contents’ and the ‘interplay between structure and content’ xliv and acknowledges the need 
for more research into the relationship xlv.  The study of fundamentalism provides an opportunity to bring 
cognitive and cultural perspectives together to observe this interplay.  Somewhat belatedly, it will address a 
dearth of examples of the long acknowledged interaction between cognition and culture.   
 
CULTURAL-COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVES ON FUNDAMENTALISM 
 
There are many contents in fundamentalist cultures (as in all cultures) that reflect the influence of cognition and 
exert an influence on cognition in an interactive cycle.  The following synthesis provides two illustrative 
examples of interactive between fundamentalist contents and cognition.  The first example illustrates the 
interaction between binary thinking and culturally reinforced binary oppositions that structure fundamentalist 
contents.  The second example illustrates fundamentalist contents that disrupt cognitive equilibrium by 
perpetuating assimilative primacy.   
 
Binary Cognition and Contents 
 
Fundamentalist cultures reflect and perpetuate an undifferentiated binary form of logical operations.  Binary 
logic proposes an either/or choice between two concepts (groups, entities, propositions etcetera).  In the binary 
pair, p or q, either p is correct or q is correct.  Developmentalist Helmut Reich describes binary logic as one of 
the earliest operations that dominates and structures a way of thinking xlvi.  Reich’s cognitive theory of relational 
and contextual reasoning (RCR) posits that development leads to more differentiated and integrated reasoning.  
In Reich’s early levels of reasoning explanandum, or competing theories are, ‘…considered separately; only one 
of them is declared correct…are alternatives…usually single-track choice of A or B’xlvii.  Binary cognition is 
also recognised in neurotheological literature xlviii.  Andrew Newberg identifies the ‘binary operator’ as one of 
several cognitive functions.  The binary operators, ‘enable the mind to make fundamental sense of things by 
reducing the most complicated relationships of space and time to simple pairs of opposites – up versus down, in 
versus out, left versus right, before versus after, and so on’ xlix.  Accordingly, binary logic serves a functional 
purpose.  Simple ‘black or white’ binary logic is perhaps more conducive to immediate action and motivation 
than more complex differentiated thinking involving ‘shades of grey’.  It seems easier to communicate and elicit 
an affective state by imposing grand dichotomies of ‘good and evil’, ‘black and white’, ‘us and them’ onto 
otherwise complex and differentiated realities.  The binary operator is a tool of simplification that may serve a 
purpose in a particular context.  However, what happens when the context changes and the binary formulation 
remains entrenched in language and culture?  The affective function of a past binary is defended as if it were an 
epistemic binary, true for all time in all contexts.  The general application of binary logic is a cognitive habit 
reflecting a tendency to process information in encompassing, undifferentiated categories.  I contend that 
fundamentalist cultures perpetuate cognitive habits by enshrining grand binary dichotomies in cultural contents.   
 
Fundamentalisms are characterised by their binary divisions between people (i.e. saved and unsaved), their 
behaviours (i.e. good and evil), and their post-mortal destinations (i.e. heaven and hell).  These divisions are 
often simplistic, holistic and charged with value.  They are simplistic in that they are untroubled by complex 
circumstances or causation for behaviours.  They are holistic in that they view the whole person in terms of a 
part of the person (a person’s articulated beliefs).  They are charged with value in that the difference between 
binaries is a matter of life and death.  In Christian and Muslim fundamentalisms this value is charged with the 
matter of eternal life or death in heaven or hell l.  The sharp binary distinctions between people are evident in the 
Protestant fundamentalist culture as ‘saved and unsaved’, ‘sheep and goats’, and ‘lost and found’.  These 
divisions are perhaps derived from or at least linked to scriptures that reinforce separation li.  Such scriptures are 
ambiguously appropriated as ‘proof texts’ and embedded in fundamentalist cultural discourse where they are 
used to perpetuate a binary division between believer and unbeliever.  The language of separation that 
demonises the world and the Other has the effect of restricting encounters with them both physically and 
cognitively.   
 
The binary division between believers and unbelievers is also evident in the Koran and disseminated into 
Islamic fundamentalist culture in the division between dar al-islam (the sphere of Islam) and dar al-harb (the 
sphere of war); the practice of dhimmitude (treatment of non-Muslims); and attitudes towards the harbis (non-
Muslims).  Such divisions are seen by fundamentalists to be supported by a text-centred interpretation of the 
verses of an infallible Koran lii.  Bat Ye’or identifies and examines a resurgence of dhimmitude in Islam and 
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Dhimmitude: Where Civilisations Collide.  He writes, ‘Because critical dialogue with a dhimmi is forbidden, the 
movement for reform and openness toward the non-Muslim did not exist in the umma’liii.  Of the lack of 
historical criticism in the closed societies of Islam Ye’or comments: ‘All these elements block the development 
of Muslim critical thought about its relationship to the harbis, the non-Muslims living outside the dar al-islam 
and not yet subjected by jihad; as well as to the dhimmis, the non-Muslims subjected by jihad to the dhimma 
‘pact of protection’’ liv.  The effect of such culturally embedded binary categorisation is disengagement with the 
Other.  Disengagement prevents opportunities to differentiate and accommodate.  Thus the cultural contents 
enforcing this binary separation perpetuate the assimilative structure by restricting social and cognitive 
opportunities to differentiate.   
 
The structuring power of fundamentalist cultures’ binary division between heaven and hell should not be 
underestimated.  In fundamentalism, heaven and hell are perceived as literal realities with a space-time existence 
to be experienced by every individual.  Jerry Falwell, America's most prominent fundamentalist evidences this 
perception: ‘Ask a Fundamentalist whether he believes there are really flames in hell and he will simply say, 
‘Yes, and hot ones too!’ lv .  Fundamentalists equate a person’s articulated belief with their eternal destiny in 
heaven or hell.  Hence, in Protestant fundamentalism a person can only be saved from eternal punishment in hell 
if ‘they confess with their lips and believe in their hearts that Jesus Christ is Lord’ lvi.  The ultimate consequence 
of this binaries (saved and unsaved in heaven or hell) permeates other content domains and structures them 
accordingly. 
 
The seriousness of the heaven and hell binary in fundamentalism leaves little room for ambiguity and no room 
for compromise.  Almost all contents are subordinated to related binaries including ‘good and evil’ and ‘saved 
and unsaved’.  Thus, subordinate cultural contents including dancing, dress, music, and movies are imbued with 
the gravity of good and evil, heaven and hell.  This subordination produces sweepingly broad binary 
categorisations.  For example, dancing is good or evil; music is good or evil; television is good or evil.  Such 
matters are imbued with ultimate concern.  They may be perceived with a ‘black and white’ binary logic and 
construed as matters of heaven and hell.  For example, a number of apostates from Southern Baptist forms of 
fundamentalism identify a former belief that all dancing is evil:  ‘Dancing became a point of confusion for me. 
We were not allowed to dance at school, but I went home for weekends… I expected [dancing] to be a sinful, 
sensuous grinding of bodies that would heat up lustful thoughts and lead directly to sex’ lvii.  The binary extends 
to subordinate contents because of the gravity of the ultimate contents: Dancing, leads to premarital sex, which 
leads to hell.   
 
The relationship between binary structuring and fundamentalist contents seems to be cyclical.  The contents 
reinforce the structural style and the structural style reinforces the contents.  Binary structuring gives rise to 
grand dichotomies which, when enshrined in culture, perpetuate binary thinking.  This is not to deny the place of 
binary logic in religious thinking, nor is it to preclude a binary approach to the contents above.  However, it is to 
suggest that binary logic dictates fundamentalist contents which in turn structure binary ways of thinking.  The 
result is a self-perpetuating cycle of logic reflecting a particular style and structure.  While this dynamic 
interaction occurs in all cultures, it is the relative strength, frequency, and permeation of the interaction that 
characterises fundamentalist cultures.  
 
Cognitive Equilibrium and Cultural Contents 
 
The contents of fundamentalist cultures characteristically suspend or compartmentalise the cognitive 
equilibrium between accommodation and assimilation.  Fundamentalist contents create the illusion that the 
existing structure is perfectly able to assimilate all possible contents (past, present and future) encountered.  
There is no need for further accommodation because the received structure is perfectly adequate for all 
environments and contingencies. A Muslim apostate reflects on this closed epistemology as a characteristic of 
their former fundamentalism: 
 
Just like other Muslims I used to believe that to learn about anything one has to go to the source. Of course the 
source of Islam is the Quran and the books written by Muslim scholars. Therefore, I felt no need to look elsewhere 
in order to find the truth, as I was convinced that I have already found it. As Muslims say ‘Talabe ilm ba’d az 
wossule ma’loom mazmoom’. The search of knowledge after gaining it is unnecessary. lviii 
 
The fundamentalist contents that strengthen this illusion (that fundamentalist knowledge is final knowledge) 
usually pertain to revealed knowledge and mandated authority.   
 
Revealed knowledge is knowledge received directly from a transcendent source.  Mandated authority is 
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authority based on divine ordination.  Contents supporting revealed knowledge passively counter any desire to 
accommodate.  There is no higher form of knowledge than revealed knowledge because there is no higher 
source of knowledge than the Transcendent omniscient God.  If knowledge may be attributed to an omniscient 
source, then all temporal restrictions and qualifications may be bypassed.  For the fundamentalist, the 
knowledge of special revelation forms a perfect structure, superior to, and able to assimilate all empirical 
knowledge that may challenge the revelation.  Therefore, accommodation is countered for no accommodation is 
deemed possible or necessary.  The structuring power of contents is particularly apparent in fundamentalist 
cultures because of the unified source of contents.  Fundamentalists tend to be people of one revealed book, 
which takes primacy in all matters of knowledge: ‘So central are these texts even to everyday life that enclave 
members resort to ‘bringing out the word,’ that is, random selection of a page in order to induce instructions or 
omens for mundane choices or actions’ lix.  This authority is revealed in fundamentalist literature.  Prominent 
apologist, Gleason Archer, writes in Alleged Errors and Discrepancies in the Original Manuscripts of the Bible: 
‘We must therefore conclude that any event or fact related in Scripture - whether it pertains to doctrine, science, 
or history - is to be accepted by the Christian as totally reliable and trustworthy, no matter what modern 
scientists or philosophers may think of it’ lx.  This source uniformity and authority is sometimes acknowledged 
as the key characteristic of fundamentalisms.  Ralph Hood defines fundamentalism in The Psychology of 
Fundamentalism lxi with an ‘intra-textual’ model: fundamentalists are those whose thinking is structured by a 
text.  Kathleen Boone’s approach is similar.  In The Bible Tells Them So: The Discourse of Protestant 
Fundamentalism, Boone writes: ‘By viewing fundamentalism as a tendency, a habit of mind rather than a 
discrete movement or phenomenon, it is possible to discern a unified body of discourse, a body of discourse 
arising from belief in the sole authority of an inerrant Bible’lxii.  The issue is inadvertently recognised by 
Korniejczuk who notes a potential clash between developmental structures and Biblical contents: 
 
For people who genuinely believe in the existence of a transcendent God, in His intervention in human affairs, and 
in the divine inspiration of His Holy Word …the course of their religious development may be different because 
they grow in their religious development adopting a biblical theoretical framework as their source of beliefs and as 
their basic conceptual presuppositions. lxiii   
 
I am suggesting that fundamentalists do not grow in their religious development because of particular cultural 
contents.  Scriptural texts are not independent of cognitive structure.  Accordingly, they may be used to facilitate 
or arrest cognitive development through assimilation and accommodation.  When combined with the 
fundamentalist doctrine of inerrancy and their tendency to use Scripture acontextually and literally, the resultant 
contents perpetuate a particular structure.   
  
In Protestant fundamentalism, revealed knowledge is evidenced by a belief in ‘inspired and inerrant Scripture’.  
In Pentecostal fundamentalism, it may manifest as a ‘word of knowledge’, or a ‘prophetic vision’.  In the 
colloquial discourse of these fundamentalisms, it is evidenced by such culturally embedded expressions as, ‘God 
said it, I believe it, that settles it’.  In formal discourse it is evidenced in the claims of apologists, such as 
Norman Geisler: ‘To stray from the Scripture in faith or conduct is disloyalty to our Master.  Recognition of the 
total truth and trustworthiness of Holy Scripture is essential to a full grasp and adequate confession of its 
authority’ lxiv.   Promulgation of the belief in a perfect structure is an effect of such claims.  The structure is 
received rather than constructed or tested through a balanced dialectic between accommodation and 
assimilation.  All the answers are contained in the culture’s revealed text, therefore no empirical evidence 
contrary to the text need be admitted.   Such a view may have some extreme manifestations. 
 
There are perhaps few more dramatic cases of scriptural authority subordinating empirical knowledge than the 
practice of ‘snake handling’ in West Virginia.  Church members take Scriptural literalismlxv and authority to the 
extreme while handling rattlesnakes and copperheads during the act of worship.  There are recorded deaths from 
snakebite inflicted during these services.  The continuing faith of the believers is perhaps testament to the 
primacy of belief over experience; assimilation outweighing accommodation.  In such a case, fundamentalism 
subordinates empirical and rational knowledge with knowledge from revelation – the perfect structure.  Contents 
that affirm the infallibility, inspiration, transcendence, and perfection of this structure passively inhibit 
accommodation.  The use of revealed knowledge to reinforce the perfect structure belief is also evident in 
Islamic fundamentalism.  
 
It is difficult to dissociate Islamic fundamentalism from moderate Islam in this regard, as nearly all Muslims 
consider the Koran to be the inspired word of the transcendent Allah lxvi.  However, it is possible to observe its 
more extreme manifestations and applications. For example, the more extreme fundamentalisms such as the 
Sunni Faramawiyyah prohibit education through any other text than the Koran lxvii. Revealed knowledge 
interpreted with a text-centred approach, asserts its primacy over all other epistemologies.  The dislocation of 
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sacred text from its historical and human construction serves to inhibit engagement with accommodative or 
potentially dissonance-causing contents. Arguably, religious believers of a single revealed book have a 
disposition towards the type of assimilative cognition and illusion of perfect structure that characterises 
fundamentalism.   
 
Contents that passively counter the accommodative process are also evidenced and enculturated in 
fundamentalist contents concerning human authority.  Mandated authority is related to revealed knowledge, 
though it concerns a human rather than textual medium.  The transmission, interpretation and protection of 
revealed knowledge are tied to mandated authority.  Examples are found in the Papal authority and the apostolic 
succession of Catholicism and in the succession of the caliphate in some expressions of Islam.  Gabriel Almond 
describes the contents that impute authority to leaders in fundamentalism: 
 
The typical form of fundamentalist organisations is charismatic, a leader-follower relationship in which the 
follower imputes extraordinary qualities, heavenly grace, special access to the deity, deep and complete 
understanding of sacred texts to the great rav, the rebbe, the imam, the virtuous jurist, the minister.  One man is set 
apart from all others… the distance between charismatic leaders and followers is illustrated in body language and 
rituals such as kissing the hand of the emir or touching the prayer garment of the rebbe. lxviii 
 
Such descriptions characterise the ‘size, power’ features of the locus of authority in early stages of 
developmentlxix.  The observance of divinely mandated authority implies that knowledge received from authority 
is superior to, and able to assimilate all empirical knowledge.  In Fowler’s typology, development is indicated 
by a ‘more self-reliant’ locus of authority.  Contrarily, fundamentalist contents create a heightened perception of 
a perfect structure and a passive defence against accommodation.  Obedience to a human authority perceived as 
being imbued with divine authority can lead to the illusion of a perfect structure.  In this scenario, no content or 
teaching beyond the authority figure need be considered or accommodated.   The cognitive effect of such 
contents is that the structure is perceived as whole, complete, and perfect: immune to accommodating dissonant 
contents.    
 
There are other counter-accommodative contents that guard the cultural boundaries of fundamentalist discourse.  
They cannot be bypassed; they must be journeyed through to exit a fundamentalist culture and mindset.  These 
contents have been described as mind-controlling devices in literature on the psychology of restrictive religion 
lxx
.  Most often, they concern doubt, deception, and punishment.  These three strategies for arresting cognitive 
change are not limited to religious fundamentalisms but are rigorously employed in fundamentalisms due to the 
perceived life and death, heaven and hell consequences for incorrect belief. 
 
In Protestant fundamentalism, doubt is embodied by the figure of Thomas.  The ‘doubting Thomas’ is seen as 
inferior for ‘blessed are those who have not seen and yet have believed’ lxxi .  To doubt is to be ‘tossed back and 
forth by the waves, and blown here and there by every wind of teaching and by the cunning and craftiness of 
men in their deceitful scheming’ lxxii.  The causes of doubt are often questioned and the integrity of the doubter 
brought into question.  It is difficult for a fundamentalist to accept that a person may struggle to accept their 
truth on intellectual grounds. Fundamentalist author, Josh McDowell, writes of doubt leading to rejection of 
faith in his seminal Evidence That Demands a Verdict: ‘The rejection of Christ is often not so much of the 
‘mind,’ but of the ‘will’; not so much ‘I can't,’ but ‘I won't’...I have found that most people reject Christ for one 
or more of the following reasons: 1. Ignorance...2. Pride...3. Moral Problem’ lxxiii.  Cultural contents of 
fundamentalism that stigmatise doubt and question the inherent integrity of the doubter serve to counter 
accommodative influences and repress development.  They reinforce assimilation by repressing the 
consideration of potentially accommodative contents.  
  
The second group of contents that actively counter accommodation concerns deception.  Fear of being deceived 
is heightened when the deception is spiritualised.  Deception is a common theme in fundamentalist discourses 
manifest in such concerns as ‘false prophets, false apostles, false teachers, deceivers, false angels of light, 
wolves in sheep's clothing’ and for some Protestant fundamentalists – the anti-Christ.  Concern about deception 
creates a climate of suspicion in Protestant fundamentalism.  In a structure where absolute truth is paramount 
and problems of interpretation rarely legitimated, dissent attributed to spiritual deception and demonisation of 
the other is commonplace.  The narratives of apostates from fundamentalism evidence a fear that their questions 
and doubts are the products of supernatural (demonic and satanic) attacks on their cognitive faculties. One 
apostate from Christian fundamentalism recalls, ‘I can remember being in tears wondering if I was wrong or 
being deceived or going to hell or whatever’ lxxiv; another writes, ‘I couldn't simply dismiss this perception the 
way I had been taught, chalking it [doubts] up to ‘Satan disguised as an angel of light’ lxxv. An apostate from 
Muslim fundamentalism recounts, ‘All I said was ‘god forgive me’ (astakhfur allah). I felt that a demon (which 
Islam believes in) must have whispered doubts in my ear. I was in shock’ lxxvi.  The fear of demonic deception 
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has a paralysing effect that protects the fundamentalist discourse from the engagement of further doubts.  It 
makes the discourse impervious to conflicting contents, reasoned objections, and contradictory experiences, as 
they may all be attributed to supernatural deception.   
 
The collective effect of such contents is to counter accommodative operations in the domain of religious 
cognition.  Thus, these culturally embedded contents indirectly perpetuate an individual’s particular way of 
structuring the world by repressing critical analysis of potentially dissonant contents.  The dissonance and doubt 
of normal ‘growth pains’ are interpreted in fundamentalisms as ‘warning signs’ of a change far less benign than 
a more adapted state of equilibrium.  The two illustrative examples mentioned in this section highlight the need 
for a more focussed, empirical and rigourous studies of the interaction between cognition and culture in 
fundamentalism lxxvii.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has attempted to present grounds for a synthesis of cultural and cognitive perspectives on religious 
fundamentalism.  This synthesis of perspectives serves to focus the term fundamentalism.  Its popular usage is 
too broad and encompassing, not because it is applied in diverse cultural contexts, but because the specific 
contents and cognitive operations that underlie the intuitive abstraction are too poorly defined.  A synthesis of 
perspectives on fundamentalism will perhaps lead to an expansion and a contraction of the term’s usage.  The 
expansion will see its increasing application to a variety of cultural contexts including non-religious cultures.  
The contraction will see its disambiguation from contents in cultures that have been stigmatised by loose 
associations.   
 
Finally, I have suggested that fundamentalisms’ characteristic cultural contents suppress the adaptive dialectic 
between accommodation and assimilation.  Perhaps, the only grounds for assessment of fundamentalisms’ 
adaptive strategies are situational and contextual. Arguably, fundamentalism’s adaptive strategy (not to 
accommodate) is becoming less feasible and less appropriate in the ‘shrinking village’ of globalisation.  
Ironically, the proselytised expansion of fundamentalisms has contributed in the exposure of one 
fundamentalism to another.  The culturally embedded contents that perpetuate assimilation and inhibit 
accommodation make for potentially violent encounters between fundamentalist cultures; and between 
fundamentalisms, modernisms and postmodernisms.  Cultural and cognitive perspectives must engage in 
synthesis in order to more fully understand the interactive forces that produce fundamentalisms.  This 
understanding may bring further clarity, if not resolution to the unavoidable dialogue with fundamentalisms and 
between fundamentalisms in the modern milieu.   
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